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We present a formal framework for modelling belief change
within a non-monotonic reasoning system. Belief change and
non-monotonic reasoning are two areas that are formally
closely related, with recent attention being paid towards the
analysis of belief change within a non-monotonic environ-
ment. In this paper we consider the classical AGM belief
change operators, contraction and revision, applied to a de-
feasible setting in the style of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor.
The investigation leads us to the formal characterisation of a
number of classes of defeasible belief change operators. For
the most interesting classes we need to consider the problem
of iterated belief change, generalising the classical work of
Darwiche and Pearl in the process. Our work involves be-
lief change operators aimed at ensuring logical consistency,
as well as the characterisation of analogous operators aimed
at obtaining coherence—an important notion within the field
of logic-based ontologies.
1 Introduction
Exploring the principles of belief change beyond the stan-
dard (propositional) AGM approach has been on the agenda
since the early days of the field. The bulk of the effort in this
direction has been driven by assuming alternative underly-
ing logical languages that are either extensions of classical
propositional logic or fragments thereof (Booth, Meyer, and
Varzinczak 2009; Booth et al. 2011; Meyer, Lee, and Booth
2005; Delgrande and Peppas 2015; Zhuang et al. 2019;
Zhuang et al. 2016; Delgrande and Wassermann 2013).
Nevertheless, for most of the history of AGM-style belief
change, the fundamental assumption of an underlying clas-
sical (Tarskian) consequence operator has not been chal-
lenged, until recently. A case in point is that of revising de-
feasible knowledge bases in which, in addition to classical
statements, defeasible statements of the form α |∼ β, read
“typically, if α, then β”, are also permitted.
Given well-known results in the literature establishing
that belief change and non-monotonic reasoning can be de-
fined in terms of each other (Gärdenfors and Makinson
1994), one could argue that an investigation of belief change
in non-monotonic settings is superfluous. Nevertheless, a
more careful analysis reveals that this is not the case. Indeed,
among the consequences of defeasible knowledge bases is a
mix of statements that follow non-monotonically and also
statements that hold classically. A major challenge in the in-
vestigation of belief change in this setting is therefore how
to define change for the monotonic part of the formalism
while simultaneously ensuring that the non-monotonic part
remains well-behaved, and the other way round. The discus-
sion above is better understood in the light of the following
example, re-adapted from Casini et al. (2018):
Example 1. Assume a propositional language built up from
the atoms a, m, n, v, and e, which stand for, respectively,
“(being) an avian red-blood cell”, “(being) a mammalian
red-blood cell”, “(having) a nucleus”, “(being) a verte-
brate red-blood cell”, and “(being) extraterrestrial”, and
an agent having the following beliefs: K = {v → n, a →
v,m→ v,m→ ¬n, a→ ¬m}.
1. Clearly the agent should conclude ¬m, which is unintu-
itive as mammalian red-blood cells do exist. To remedy this,
classical belief change would proceed by removing some of
the statements in K, such as either m → v, v → n, or
m → ¬n. With non-monotonic belief change the goal is to
achieve the same result through the introduction of defea-
sibility, namely by weakening v → n to v |∼ n to obtain
K′ = {v |∼ n, a→ v,m→ v,m→ ¬n, a→ ¬m}.
2. Any well-behaved version of defeasible inheritance
should ensure that the agent defeasibly concludes a |∼ n
from K′. But upon learning that a |∼ ¬n, the agent should
not defeasibly conclude a |∼ n from K′′ = K′ ∪ {a |∼ ¬n},
since this was a defeasible conclusion from K′, which is in
conflict with the explicitly provided new information.
3. If the agent then learns that a |∼ n is indeed the case
to arrive at K′′′ = K′′ ∪ {a |∼ n}, it should introduce a
conflict with a |∼ ¬n, forcing the conclusion a |∼ ⊥ (that
there are no avian cells). Such a conflict cannot be handled
by the non-monotonic machinery alone. In order to get rid
of it, one needs to define principled revision operators.
4. Finally, assume that, even though the agent considers
the existence of mammalian, non-vertebrate red-blood cells
to be impossible because of m→ v, it is informed that mam-
malian, non-vertebrate red-blood cells are presumably ex-
traterrestrial (m ∧ ¬v |∼ e). It can react to this informa-
tion in two ways: either it considers the defeasible statement
m ∧ ¬v |∼ e already satisfied in a trivial way, since it is a
weaker form of m∧¬v→ e which itself is implied by m→ v,
or it follows the reasoning principle, popular for example in
formal ontologies, that if we speak of some entity we must
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assume that it exists: the statement m ∧ ¬v |∼ e requires us
to forego m→ v.
In this paper our focus is on belief change (revision and
contraction) for sets of defeasible statements. We provide
representation results for basic forms of belief change for
a non-monotonic setting, but then show that these are not
sufficiently restrictive to capture well-behaved forms of be-
lief change. It turns out that an extension to iterated belief
change in the style of Darwiche and Pearl (1997) addresses
this deficiency. We generalise the classical work of Dar-
wiche and Pearl (1997) and characterise a family of oper-
ators for iterated revision, followed by an analogous charac-
terisation of operators for iterated contraction. In particular,
we consider belief change operators aimed at obtaining log-
ical consistency for defeasible sets, and analogous operators
aimed at the obtaining coherence, an important notion in the
specification of formal ontologies and that we have briefly
encountered in Item 4 of Example 1 above.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the basics of belief change and KLM-style
defeasible reasoning. Section 3 introduces basic defeasible
revision and basic coherence defeasible revision via AGM-
style sets of postulates and construction methods, linked up
through appropriate representation results. Section 4 extends
the results of section 3 and defines full defeasible revision
and full coherence revision by adding Darwiche-Pearl style
postulates, and linking these up to extended construction
methods via representation results. Sections 5 and 6 follow
patterns similar to those of sections 3 and 4, but for defea-
sible contraction. Section 7 investigates the extent to which
defeasible revision and contraction can be defined in terms
of each other using versions of the Levi and Harper Identi-
ties. Section 8 discusses related and future work.
2 Preliminaries
L denotes the (finitely generated) language built up from a
finite set of atomic propositions P . We use α, β, . . . to de-
note the sentences ofL. U denotes the set of all propositional
valuations. Given α ∈ L, JαK def= {u ∈ U | u  α} denotes
the models of α, where  is the classical satisfaction rela-
tion. For X ⊆ L, JXK def=
⋂
α∈XJαK. Cn(·) denotes classi-
cal (Tarskian) logical consequence in propositional logic. In
our examples we denote valuations as sequences of literals,
with a negative literal denoted by a barred atom. E.g., for
P = {p, q}, pq denotes the valuation satisfying p, but not q.
AGM-Style Belief Change. Belief change is concerned
with the problem of modifying an agent’s beliefs in a princi-
pled way. The AGM approach to belief change (Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) has become the gold stan-
dard in the area. It assumes an underlying logic with a propo-
sitional language and the above consequence operator Cn(·).
A belief set B is assumed to be a set of propositional sen-
tences closed under Cn(·). The AGM approach is concerned
with three basic types of operations on belief sets: expan-
sion, contraction, and revision. Expansion is simply defined
as adding a sentence and closing under classical entailment:
B+α def=Cn(B ∪ {α}). The expected outcome of contraction
of B with α is a belief set B − α not entailing α. Dually,
the revision of B with α corresponds to a consistent belief
set B ∗ α from which α follows. Revision can be defined
in terms of contraction and expansion via the Levi Iden-
tity (Levi 1977): B ∗ α = B − (¬α) + α, while contraction
can be defined in terms of revision and intersection via the
Harper Identity (Gärdenfors 1988): B − α = (B ∗ ¬α) ∩ B.
In the AGM approach, the behaviour of the change op-
erators described above is characterised in terms of postu-
lates, and several construction methods have been investi-
gated over the past 35 years. A popular method is to define
the operators on epistemic states (Darwiche and Pearl 1997;
Booth and Meyer 2006), each with an associated total pre-
order and belief set. A feature of epistemic states is that they
provide an elegant way to define iterated revision.
KLM-Style Defeasible Reasoning. The framework pro-
posed by Kraus et al. (1990), often referred to as the KLM
approach, employs defeasible statements of the form α |∼
β, read as “typically, if α, then β”. The semantics of rational
defeasible statements is in terms of ordered structures re-
ferred to as ranked interpretations (Lehmann and Magidor
1992). Here we adopt the following alternative representa-
tion thereof. A ranked interpretation R is a function from U
to N∪{∞} s.t. R(u) = 0 for some u ∈ U , and satisfying the
following convexity property: for every v ∈ U , if R(v) = i,
then, for every j s.t. 0 ≤ j < i, there is a u ∈ U for
which R(u) = j. Valuations with a lower rank are deemed
more normal (or typical) than those with a higher rank, while
those with an infinite rank are regarded as so atypical as
to be impossible. A ranked interpretation R satisfies (is a
ranked model of) α |∼ β (denoted R  α |∼ β), where
α, β ∈ L, if the α-valuations u that are minimal w.r.t. their
rank R(u) also satisfy β. Observe that all classical proposi-
tional sentences can be expressed as defeasible statements:
{u ∈ U | R(u) ∈ N} ⊆ JαK iff R  ¬α |∼ ⊥. KLM-style
defeasible reasoning can therefore be viewed as an extension
of propositional logic.
3 Basic Defeasible Revision
In the approach to belief revision taken by Darwiche and
Pearl (1997) and elaborated on by Booth and Meyer (2006),
revision is performed on epistemic states where “An epis-
temic state contains, in addition to a knowledge base, all
the information needed for coherent reasoning including, in
particular, the strategy for belief revision which the agent
wishes to employ at a given time.” (Booth and Meyer 2006)
Darwiche and Pearl associate a total preorder  over the
set of all valuations with an epistemic state, as well as a be-
lief set, closed under classical consequence, with the val-
uations that are -minimal being the models of the belief
set. The belief set associated with an epistemic state rep-
resents the beliefs of an agent, whereas the epistemic state
as a whole represents, not only the current beliefs of the
agent, but also the additional information required for the
agent to perform belief revision. That additional informa-
tion is captured in the ordering over all valuations, including
the counter-models of the belief set.
We follow a similar approach and denote the set of all
epistemic states by E . In our case, to define revision for de-
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feasible reasoning we associate with each epistemic state an
enriched structure that we refer to as an epistemic interpre-
tation. Intuitively the idea is to provide an ordering over the
set of counter-models of the classical belief set, similar to
the way in which Darwiche and Pearl do. But in order to
account for defeasible statements we also provide an order-
ing over the models of the belief set. Models of the belief
set are taken to have a finite rank whereas counter-models of
the belief set are taken to have an infinite rank. This is for-
malised by assigning to each valuation u a tuple of the form
〈f, i〉 or 〈∞, i〉 where i ∈ N. The f in 〈f, i〉 is intended to
indicate that u has a finite rank, while the ∞ in 〈∞, i〉 is
intended to indicated that u has an infinite rank, where fi-
nite ranks are viewed as more typical than infinite ranks. To
capture this formally, let R def= {〈f, i〉 | i ∈ N} ∪ {〈∞, i〉 |
i ∈ N}. We define the total ordering  over R as follows:
〈x1, y1〉  〈x2, y2〉 if and only if x1 = x2 and y1 ≤ y2,
or x1 = f and x2 = ∞. Before we can define epistemic
interpretations, we need to extend the notion of convexity of
ranked interpretations (encountered in the preliminaries) to
epistemic interpretations. Let e be a function from U to R. e
is said to be convex (w.r.t.) if and only the following holds:
i) If e(u) = 〈f, i〉, then, for all j s.t. 0 ≤ j < i, there is a
uj ∈ U s.t. e(uj) = 〈f, j〉; and ii) If e(u) = 〈∞, i〉, then,
for all j s.t. 0 ≤ j < i, there is a uj ∈ U s.t. e(uj) = 〈∞, j〉.
Definition 1. An epistemic interpretation e is a total func-
tion from U to R that is convex.
Viewed from the classical perspective, epistemic interpre-
tations are refined versions of the total preorders over valu-
ations used in classical AGM revision, in which the models
of the belief set on which to perform revision are also or-
dered (or ranked) to provide a semantics for defeasible state-
ments. Viewed from the perspective of defeasible reasoning,
epistemic interpretations are refined versions of ranked in-
terpretations in which the valuations with infinite rank are
also ordered (or ranked) to perform revision.
We refer to the epistemic interpretation e associated with
the epistemic state E as eE, but we abuse notation slightly by
referring to eE simply as E. We let Uf (E)def={u ∈ U | E(u) =
〈f, i〉 for some i ∈ N} and U∞(E) def= {u ∈ U | E(u) =
〈∞, i〉 for some i ∈ N}. E is satisfiable if Uf (E) 6= ∅. We
let minEJαK def={u ∈ JαK | E(u)  E(v) for all v ∈ JαK}, and
minfEJαK
def= minEJαK ∩ Uf (E). Let rEmaxV = max{E(u) |
u ∈ V} and rEminV = min{E(u) | u ∈ V}.
The notion of satisfaction carries over to epistemic inter-
pretations in the obvious way: α |∼ β is true in E (E 
α |∼ β) if and only if minfEJαK ⊆ JβK. The set of epis-
temic models of a defeasible statement is defined as follows:
Jα |∼ βK def= {E | E  α |∼ β}. Two defeasible statements
α |∼ β and γ |∼ δ are said to be rank-equivalent, denoted
by α |∼ β ≡E γ |∼ δ, if and only if Jα |∼ βK = Jγ |∼ δK.
The defeasible analogue of a belief set w.r.t. an epistemic
state is a defeasible belief set.
Definition 2. A defeasible belief set D is a defeasible set
for which there is an epistemic state E s.t. E  α |∼ β
if and only if α |∼ β ∈ D. The defeasible belief set as-
sociated with an epistemic state E is defined as follows:
B(E) def= {α |∼ β | E  α |∼ β}. The classical belief set
associated with an epistemic state E is defined as follows:
Bc(E) def= Cn({¬α | E  α |∼ ⊥}).
To make sense of the last part of the definition above,
observe that, similar to the case for ranked interpretations
mentioned in section 2, a defeasible statement α |∼ ⊥ can
be viewed as equivalent to the classical statement ¬α since
E  α |∼ ⊥ if and only Uf (E) ⊆ J¬αK. Observe that Bc(E)
is, by definition, a belief set (closed under classical conse-
quence). It is easily shown that JBc(E)K = Uf (E).
Our initial focus is on consistency-based revision in
which revision should not result in an inconsistent epistemic
state (one from which > |∼ ⊥ follows). As a start, we pro-
vide some basic AGM-style postulates for revision. Our ini-
tial goal is to focus on the (classical) belief set associated
with an epistemic state after revision.
E is said to be α-enforcing when Uf (E) ⊆ JαK. α |∼ β is
said to be compatible when U * J¬(α ∧ β)K, E-compatible
when Uf (E) * J¬(α∧ β)K, and weakly E-compatible when
it is E-compatible or E is ¬α-enforcing. Note that if α |∼ β
is incompatible, then it is also E-incompatible.
(B*1) E ∗ α |∼ β is an epistemic state (Closure)
(B*2) Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) ⊆ Bc(E) + α→ β (Inclusion)
(B*3) If α |∼ β is weakly E-compatible, then
Bc(E) = Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) (Strict Vacuity)
(B*4) α |∼ β ∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ β) (Success)
(B*5) If α |∼ β ≡E γ |∼ δ, then
E ∗ (α |∼ β) = E ∗ (γ |∼ δ) (Extensionality)
(B*6) > |∼ ⊥ ∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ β) if and only if
α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ ⊥ (Consistency)
(B*7) Bc(E ∗ α ∧ γ |∼ β) ∩ Bc(E) ⊆
(Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) + γ) ∩ Bc(E)
(B*8) If ¬γ /∈ Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β), then
(Bc(E∗α |∼ β)+γ)∩Bc(E) ⊆ Bc(E∗α∧γ |∼ β)∩Bc(E)
(B*9) Bc(E)∩Cn(α ∧ β) ⊆ Bc(E∗α |∼ β) (Containment)
(B*1)-(B*8) are close analogues of the classical AGM pos-
tulates for revision and we will not discuss all of them in
detail here. Note that (B*2), (B*3), and (B7)-(B*9) all refer
to the classical belief set associated with the revised state.
To see, for example, why (B*3) applies only to the classi-
cal belief set associated with the revised epistemic state, and
not to the defeasible belief set as a whole, bear in mind that
we are dealing with non-monotonic reasoning. As a very
simple example, consider an epistemic state E over p and
q, with the elements of J¬pK ranked at (f, 0) and the ele-
ments of JpK at (f, 1) (and nothing ranked at (∞, i) for all
i). Note that > |∼ ¬p ∈ B(E), and that > |∼ p is weakly E-
compatible, but that any reasonable defeasible revision op-
erator will have that > |∼ ¬p /∈ B(E ∗ > |∼ p).
Containment (B*9) is the only postulate without a classi-
cal counterpart. It ensures that the belief set associated with
E, when restricted to the consequences of α ∧ β, are con-
tained in the belief set associated with the epistemic state
resulting from a revision with α |∼ β. Semantically speak-
ing this ensures that only elements of Jα∧ βK may be added
to Uf (E) to obtain Uf (E ∗ α |∼ β).




〈∞, 1〉 U \ (JBc(E)K ∪ {amvne, amvne})
〈∞, 0〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 1〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
〈f, 0〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
E ∗ a |∼ ¬n :
〈∞, 1〉 U \ JBc(E)K ∪ ({amvne, amvne})
〈∞, 0〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 2〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 1〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
〈f, 0〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
Figure 1: Example of a basic defeasible revision operator.
Definition 3. ∗ is an admissible defeasible revision opera-
tor if E ∗ α |∼ β  α |∼ β, and E ∗ α |∼ β = E ∗ γ |∼ δ
if α |∼ β ≡E γ |∼ δ. An admissible defeasible revision
operator ∗ is a basic defeasible revision operator if it is
defined as follows: E ∗ α |∼ β def= E′, where E′ is an epis-
temic state such that Uf (E′) = Uf (E) if α |∼ β is weakly
E-compatible, Uf (E′) = ∅ if α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ ⊥, and
Uf (E′) def= Uf (E) ∪minEJα ∧ βK otherwise.
Theorem 1. ∗ satisfies (B*1) to (B*9) if and only if it is a
basic defeasible revision operator.
Example 2. Consider Item 2 of Example 1 and suppose
that the beliefs of an agent are described as the defea-
sible belief set associated with the epistemic state E in
Fig. 1. Note that E is satisfiable, that {v |∼ n, a →
v,m → v,m → ¬n, a → ¬m} ⊆ B(E), that Bc(E) =
Cn({a→ v,m→ v,m→ ¬n, a→ ¬m}), and that a |∼ n ∈
B(E). In Fig. 1 we show how one of the possible basic de-
feasible revision operators ∗ behaves when revising with
a |∼ ¬n. First off, note that a |∼ ¬n is E-compatible, from
which it follows (via (B*3)) that Uf (E ∗ a |∼ ¬n) = Uf (E).
And then observe that E is modified as follows to obtain
E ∗ a |∼ ¬n. Except for two valuations, amvne and amvne,
all valuations retain the same rank. These two valuations
are moved ‘up’ by changing their rank of 〈f, 0〉 to a (fi-
nite) rank of 〈f, 2〉. This has the effect of ensuring that
a |∼ ¬n ∈ B(E ∗ a |∼ ¬n) since minE∗a|∼¬nJaK ⊆ J¬nK.
It is important to note that this is one of many ways in which
basic defeasible revision operators could have dealt with a
revision with a |∼ ¬n.
Observe that basic defeasible revision (via Strict Vacuity)
will keep the belief set associated with the epistemic state E
unchanged through a revision by α |∼ β whenever α |∼ ⊥ is
true in E, since α |∼ β is then also true in E. This may seem
counter-intuitive, but it is essentially because basic defeasi-
ble revision is consistency-based. If we aim to obtain coher-
ence we need to consider coherence-based revision where a
revision by α |∼ β should not result in an epistemic state
from which α |∼ ⊥ follows. This can be done by replacing
(B*3) with (B*3’) and adding (B*10) below.
(B*3’) If α |∼ β is E-compatible, then
Bc(E) = Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) (Weak Vacuity)
(B*10) α |∼ ⊥ ∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ β) if and only if
α |∼ β ≡E α |∼ ⊥ (Coherence)
Weak Vacuity requires E to remain unchanged after a revi-
sion by α |∼ β only when the latter is E-compatible. Coher-
ence ensures that the only reason for an α |∼ β-revision to
contain α |∼ ⊥ is if the former is, in fact, rank-equivalent to
α |∼ ⊥.
Definition 4. An admissible revision operator ∗ is a basic
coherence defeasible revision operator if it is defined as fol-
lows: E ∗ α |∼ β def= E′ where E′ is an epistemic state such
that Uf (E′) = Uf (E) if α |∼ β is E-compatible, Uf (E′) def= ∅
if α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ ⊥, and Uf (E′) def= Uf (E) ∪minEJα ∧ βK
otherwise.
Theorem 2. ∗ satisfies (B*1) to (B*10), with (B*3) replaced
by (B*3’), if and only if it is a basic coherence defeasible
revision operator.
Example 3. Consider Item 4 of Example 1. E′ in Fig. 2 cor-
responds to the epistemic state E ∗ a |∼ ¬n from Example
2. We want to revise with m ∧ ¬v |∼ e. Note that Bc(E′) =
Cn({a→ v,m→ v,m→ ¬n}), that m ∧ ¬v |∼ e ∈ B(E′)
since ¬(m ∧ ¬v) ∈ Bc(E′), and m ∧ ¬v |∼ e is weakly E′-
compatible, but not E′-compatible. We can implement two
kinds of revision policies. If we are interested in obtaining
consistency, we would implement a basic defeasible revision
operator ∗. We already have that m ∧ ¬v |∼ e ∈ B(E′) and,
because of (B*3), we are not allowed to change the belief set
associated with the epistemic state. Hence a viable revision
policy is simply doing nothing: E′ ∗m ∧ ¬v |∼ e = E′.
If we are interested in obtaining coherence then, with the
introduction of m∧¬v |∼ e, we are forced by (B*10) and al-
lowed by (B*3’) to change the belief set associated with the
epistemic state, allowing for the existence of non-vertebrate
mammalian red-blood cells (m ∧ ¬v). We can do it, for ex-
ample, by moving elements of Jm∧¬v ∧ eK ‘down’ from the
(infinite) rank of 〈∞, 0〉 to the (finite) rank of 〈f, 3〉, as in
Fig. 2. In this way we make extraterrestrial non-vertebrate
mammalians conceivable, but we consider them as a very
implausible option, since elements of Jm ∧ ¬v ∧ eK occur
only in the highest finite rank. As required, the defeasible
statement m |∼ v now becomes purely defeasible (m |∼ v
holds in the new epistemic state, but m→ v doesn’t).
From Theorems 1 and 2 we have that both forms of revi-
sion defined above generalise classical basic AGM revision.
Corollary 1. 1. Let ∗ be a basic defeasible revision opera-
tor, E an epistemic state, and α ∈ L. Then there is a basic
AGM revision operator *’ s.t. Bc(E)∗′α = Bc(E∗¬α |∼ ⊥).
Conversely, suppose that ∗′ is a basic AGM revision opera-
tor, let B be a belief set, and let E be such that Bc(E) =
K. Then there is a basic defeasible revision operator ∗
s.t. Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) = B ∗′ α.
2. Let ∗ be a basic coherence defeasible revision operator,
E an epistemic state, and α ∈ L. Then there is a basic AGM




〈∞, 1〉 U \ JBc(E)K ∪ ({amvne, amvne})
〈∞, 0〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 2〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 1〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
〈f, 0〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
E′ ∗m ∧ ¬v |∼ e :
〈∞, 1〉 U \ JBc(E)K ∪ ({amvne, amvne})
〈f, 3〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 2〉 amvne, amvne
〈f, 1〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
〈f, 0〉 amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne, amvne
Figure 2: Basic coherence defeasible revision.
revision operator *’ s.t. Bc(E) ∗′ α = Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥).
Conversely, suppose that ∗′ is a basic AGM revision opera-
tor, let B be a belief set, and let E be such that Bc(E) = K.
Then there is a basic coherence defeasible revision operator
∗ s.t. Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) = B ∗′ α.
It follows that basic defeasible revision and basic coher-
ence defeasible revision coincide when revising with state-
ments of the form α |∼ ⊥.
Basic (coherence) defeasible revision uses the ranking of
elements in U∞(E) to perform revision in a systematic way,
but largely ignores the ranking of elements in Uf (E). The
extended forms of revision we present in the next section
takes the ranking of elements in Uf (E) into account as well.
The following two properties require the epistemic state
to remain unchanged following a revision with α |∼ β when
α |∼ β already follows from it (and in the case of obtaining
coherence, α |∼ ⊥ doesn’t).
If α |∼ β ∈ B(E), then E ∗ α |∼ β = E (Inertia)
If α |∼ β ∈ B(E) and α |∼ ⊥ /∈ B(E), then
E ∗ α |∼ β = E (Coherence Inertia)
The following example shows that Inertia and Coherence In-
ertia are too strong.
Example 4. For P = {p, q} let E be such that E(pq) =
〈f, 0〉, E(pq) = E(pq) = 〈∞, 0〉, and E(pq) = 〈∞, 1〉. Note
that p ∨ q |∼ p ∈ B(E). It seems reasonable to require that
under some circumstances, strengthening p ∨ q by adding
¬(p∧q) should still yield p as the consequent of a defeasible
statement. And indeed, basic (coherence) defeasible revision
allows for that. Yet, Inertia and Coherence Inertia will have
as a result that (p∨ q)∧¬(p∧ q) 6|∼ p ∈ B(E ∗ p∨ q |∼ p).
The following weaker versions of Inertia seem more rea-
sonable. They require the defeasible belief set associated
with an epistemic state to remain unchanged when α |∼ β
already follows from it (and in the case of obtaining coher-
ence, α |∼ ⊥ doesn’t).
(B*11) If α |∼ β ∈ B(E), then
B(E ∗ α |∼ β) = B(E) (Weak Inertia)
(B*12) If α |∼ β ∈ B(E) and α |∼ ⊥ /∈ B(E), then
B(E ∗ α |∼ β) = B(E) (Coherence Weak Inertia)
The following example shows that basic defeasible revision
does not satisfy Weak Inertia, and basic coherence defeasi-
ble revision does not satisfy Coherence Weak Inertia.
Example 5. For P = {p, q} let E be such that E(pq) =
〈f, 0〉 and E(pq) = E(pq) = E(pq) = 〈f, 1〉. Basic defea-
sible revision and basic coherence defeasible revision allow
for a revision with p |∼ q to result in E′ where E(pq) = 〈f, 0〉
and E(pq) = 〈f, 1〉, and E(pq) = E(pq) = 〈f, 2〉. Note that
p |∼ q ∈ B(E) and p |∼ ⊥ /∈ B(E), that ¬q |∼ p /∈ B(E),
but that ¬q |∼ p ∈ B(E′).
We conclude this section with a semantic description of
these versions of Inertia.
(SB*11) If α |∼ β ∈ B(E), then Uf (E) = Uf (E ∗ α |∼ β)
and E(u) = (E ∗ α |∼ β)(u)
for all u ∈ Uf (E) (Semantic Weak Inertia)
(SB*12) If α |∼ β ∈ B(E) and α |∼ ⊥ /∈ B(E), then
Uf (E) = Uf (E∗α |∼ β) and E(u) = (E∗α |∼ β)(u) for
all u ∈ Uf (E) (Semantic Coherence Weak Inertia)
Proposition 1. A basic defeasible revision operator ∗ (co-
herence defeasible revision operator) satisfies (B*11) (satis-
fies (B*12)) iff it satisfies (SB*11) (satisfies (SB*12)).
Example 6. Looking at Example 2, the basic defeasible re-
vision operator described there satisfies Inertia (and there-
fore Weak Inertia) for a revision with m ∧ ¬v |∼ e since
E′ remains unchanged following such a revision. The coher-
ence defeasible revision operator described in the example
vacuously satisfies Coherence Inertia (and therefore Coher-
ence Weak Inertia) for a revision with m∧¬v |∼ e. Observe
that (B*10) forces us to modify E′ by introducing elements
of Jm∧¬v ∧ eK into Uf (E ∗m∧¬v |∼ e) in order to obtain
coherence w.r.t. m ∧ ¬v.
4 Full Defeasible Revision
The focus in the previous section was on specifying the clas-
sical belief set associated with a revised epistemic state. In
this section we focus on determining the full defeasible be-
lief set associated with a revised epistemic state. It turns out
that this can be done by specifying a number of postulates
that constrain the way iterated revision is performed.
(BDP*1) If α  γ, then for all δ,
α |∼ δ ∈ B(E∗α |∼ β) iff α |∼ δ ∈ B(E∗γ |∼ β∗α |∼ β)
(BDP*2) If α  γ, then for all δ, α |∼ δ ∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ ¬β)
iff α |∼ δ ∈ B(E ∗ γ |∼ β ∗ α |∼ ¬β)
(BDP*3) If α |∼ γ ∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ β), then α |∼ γ ∈
B(E ∗ α |∼ γ ∗ α |∼ β)
(BDP*4) If α |∼ ¬γ /∈ B(E ∗ α |∼ β), then α |∼ ¬γ /∈
B(E ∗ α |∼ γ ∗ α |∼ β)
(BDP*5) If α  ¬γ, then for all δ,
α |∼ δ ∈ B(E∗α |∼ β) iff α |∼ δ ∈ B(E∗γ |∼ β∗α |∼ β)
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The first four postulates above are analogues of the postu-
lates for iterated revision proposed by Darwiche and Pearl
(1997). Motivations for the latter were discussed in detail by
Darwiche and Pearl (1997), and also by Booth and Meyer
(2006). These motivations carry over to our versions of the
postulates, and we don’t discuss them here. The fifth pos-
tulate does not have an analogue in the classical case. It
states that revision with a defeasible statement with α as
the antecedent overrides a prior revision with a defeasible
statement with an antecedent that is disjoint with α when it
comes to defeasible consequences with α as antecedent. Its
motivation is similar to the motivation for (BDP*2). Kern-
Isberner (2018) proposed semantic versions of the five pos-
tulates above in the context identifying a a special case of
a more general operator for change by sets of conditionals.
She refers to them as (CP1a-CP1c), (CP2*), and (CP3*). We
restate those postulates below.
(SDP*1) If u, v ∈ Jα ∧ βK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E ∗ α |∼ β) (u)  (E ∗ α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP*2) If u, v ∈ Jα ∧ ¬βK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E ∗ α |∼ β) (u)  (E ∗ α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP*3) If u ∈ Jα ∧ βK and v ∈ Jα ∧ ¬βK, then E(u) ≺
E(v) implies
(E ∗ α |∼ β) (u) ≺ (E ∗ α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP*4) If u ∈ Jα ∧ βK and v ∈ Jα ∧ ¬βK, then E(u) 
E(v) implies
(E ∗ α |∼ β) (u)  (E ∗ α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP*5) If u, v ∈ J¬αK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E ∗ α |∼ β) (u)  (E ∗ α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP*1) states that the elements of Jα ∧ βK keep their rel-
ative ranking when revising by α |∼ β. (SDP*2) states that
the elements of Jα ∧ ¬βK keep their relative ranking when
revising by α |∼ β. (SDP*3) and (SDP*4) together state
that when revising by α |∼ β, the elements of Jα ∧ βK can
be slid “down” the ranking w.r.t. the elements of Jα ∧ ¬βK.
(SDP*5) states that when revising by α |∼ β, the elements
of J¬αK keep their relative ranking, but there is no constraint
on how the elements of J¬αK are ranked w.r.t. the elements
of JαK. The motivation for (SDP*5) is that, since defeasible
statements are conditional on the antecedent, a revision with
a defeasible statement having α as the antecedent should be
independent of the ranking of elements of J¬αK.
Lemma 1. Given postulates (B*1)-(B*9), for i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (BDP*i) and (SDP*i) are equivalent.
This strengthens basic (coherence) defeasible revision
Definition 5. A full (coherence) defeasible revision opera-
tor is a basic (coherence) defeasible revision operator satis-
fying (SDP*1)-(SDP*5).
Theorem 3. ∗ satisfies (B*1)-(B*9) and (BDP*1)-(BDP*5)
if and only if it is a full defeasible revision operator. ∗
satisfies (B*1)-(B*10), with (B*3) replaced by (B*3’), and
(BDP*1)-(BDP*5) if and only if it is a full coherence defea-
sible revision operator.
As mentioned in the previous section, unlike basic (coher-
ence) defeasible revision, full (coherence) defeasible revi-
sion takes the ranking of the elements of Uf (E) into account.
It does so by restricting the relative ranking of elements U
as specified by (SDP*1)-(SDP*5) and, as a consequence, it
restricts the relative ranking of elements of U(E) as well.
Consider the following simple example.
Example 7. For P = {p, q r} let E be such that E(pqr) =
〈f, 0〉, E(pqr) = 〈f, 1〉, E(pqr) = 〈f, 2〉, and u = 〈(∞, 0〉
for all u ∈ U \ {pqr, pqr, pqr}. Note that p |∼ ¬q ∈ B(E)
and ¬q |∼ r ∈ B(E), but p |∼ q /∈ B(E). It seems reason-
able to require that ¬q |∼ r ∈ B(E ∗ p |∼ q). And while
full (coherence) defeasible revision requires us to draw this
conclusion, basic (coherence) defeasible revision does not
guarantee it. The difference in this case is that full (coher-
ence) defeasible revision (via (SDP*2) requires of us to re-
tain the relative ranking of pqr and pqr from E to E ∗ p |∼ q
since both are elements of Jp ∧ ¬qK.
We conclude this section by presenting a concrete (coher-
ence) defeasible revision operator. It is styled on Boutilier’s
Natural Revision operator (1996) for classical iterated revi-
sion. When performing a revision with α |∼ β, it changes the
relative ranking of only the minimal elements of Jα∧βK, and
then it moves them down as little as possible to ensure that
α |∼ β holds in the revised epistemic state.
Definition 6. (Natural Defeasible Revisions)
Natural Defeasible Revision: E ∗ α |∼ β def= E′ where
1. if E  α |∼ β, then E′ = E; else
2. if α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ ⊥, then E′(u) = 〈∞, i〉 where
E(u) = 〈f, i〉 for all u ∈ Uf (E), and E′(u) = 〈∞, j +
i〉 where rEmaxUf (E) = 〈f, j〉; else
3. E′(u) = E(u) for all (u ∈ U∞(E) \ minEJα ∧ βK) ∪
{v | v ≺ rEminJα ∧ ¬βK, E′(u) = rEminJα ∧ ¬βK for
all u ∈ minEJα ∧ βK, and E′(u) = E(u) + 1 for all
u ∈ {v ∈ Uf (E) | rEminJα ∧ ¬βK  v}.
Natural Coherence Defeasible Revision: E ∗ α |∼ β def= E′
where
1. if E  α |∼ β and E 6 α |∼ ⊥, then E′ = E; else
2. if α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ ⊥, then E′(u) = 〈∞, i〉 where
E(u) = 〈f, i〉 for all u ∈ Uf (E), and E′(u) = 〈∞, j +
i〉 where rEmaxUf (E) = 〈f, j〉; else
3. E′(u) = E(u) for all (u ∈ U∞(E) \ minEJα ∧ βK) ∪
{v | v ≺ rEminJα ∧ ¬βK, E′(u) = rEminJα ∧ ¬βK for
all u ∈ minEJα ∧ βK, and E′(u) = E(u) + 1 for all
u ∈ {v ∈ Uf (E) | rEminJα ∧ ¬βK  v}.
Proposition 2. Natural (Coherence) Defeasible Revision
is a full (coherence) defeasible revision operator satisfying
(Coherence) Inertia (and (Coherence) Weak Inertia).
To get a sense of what Natural (Coherence) Defeasible
Revision is about, consider the following simple example.
Example 8. For P = {p, q} let E be such that E(pq) =
〈f, 0〉, E(pq) = 〈f, 1〉, E(pq) = 〈f, 2〉, and E(pq) = 〈f, 3〉. A
(coherence) defeasible revision with p will result in E′ where
E′(pq) = 〈f, 0〉, E′(pq) = 〈f, 1〉, E′(pq) = 〈f, 2〉, and
E′(pq) = 〈f, 3〉. This ensures, for example, that ¬q |∼ ¬p,
which is in B(E), is retained in B(E ∗ p). But note that full
(coherence) defeasible revision with p also allows for E′′
where E′(pq) = 〈f, 0〉, E′(pq) = 〈f, 1〉, E′(pq) = 〈f, 2〉,
and E′(pq) = 〈f, 3〉, and that ¬q |∼ ¬p /∈ B(E′′).
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5 Basic Defeasible Contraction
We now turn to defeasible contraction. Observe that there is
no distinction between obtaining consistency and obtaining
coherence in the case of contraction operators. Or rather, ob-
taining coherence is folded into contraction in the following
sense. If a contraction by α |∼ β is performed, the Success
postulate below guarantees that α |∼ β will not be in the de-
feasible belief set associated with the contracted epistemic
state (unless it is rank-equivalent to > |∼ >).
(B-1) E− (α |∼ β)) is an epistemic state (Closure)
(B-2) Bc(E− α |∼ β) ⊆ Bc(E) (Inclusion)
(B-3) If α→ β /∈ B(E), then
Bc(E) ⊆ Bc(E− α |∼ β) (Vacuity)
(B-4) If α |∼ β 6≡E > |∼ >, then
α |∼ β /∈ B(E− α |∼ β) (Success)
(B-5) If α |∼ β ≡E γ |∼ δ, then
E− (α |∼ β) = E− (γ |∼ δ) (Extensionality)
(B-6) Bc(E) ∩ Cn(α ∧ ¬β) ⊆
Bc(E− α |∼ β) (Containment)
(B-7) (Bc(E)− α |∼ β) ∩ (Bc(E)− γ |∼ β) ⊆
Bc(E)− α ∧ γ |∼ β (Conjunction Overlap)
(B-8) If γ |∼ β /∈ Bc(E)− α ∧ γ |∼ β, then
Bc(E)− α ∧ γ |∼ β ⊆ (Bc(E)− α |∼ β)∩
(Bc(E)− γ |∼ β) (Conjunction Inclusion)
Except for (B-6), these postulates are all close analogues of
the classical AGM postulates for contraction, ans we will
not discuss them here in detail. Note that (B-2), (B-3), and
(B-6)-(B-8) refer to the classical belief set associated with
an epistemic state, and not to the full defeasible belief set.
Containment ensures that when contracting by α |∼ β, only
elements of Jα ∧ ¬βK can change from an infinite rank to
a finite rank. It is a replacement for the following postulate
which is too strong in this context.
If α |∼ β ∈ B(E), then Bc(E) =
Bc(E− α |∼ β) + α→ β (Semi-Classic Recovery)
Semi-Classic Recovery insists that if α |∼ β holds in an
epistemic state E, then after a contraction by α |∼ β, the be-
lief set associated with the contracted E should be such that
an expansion by α→ β will give us back the original belief
set. But this does not take into account that it is possible that
α |∼ β can follow from E without α→ β following from the
belief set associated with E. Note that the following version
of Recovery is a consequence of Containment.
(B-10) If α→ β ∈ Bc(E), then Bc(E) =
Bc(E− α |∼ β) + α→ β (Classic Recovery)
We shall see below that it makes sense to consider a defea-
sible version of Recovery. For this we need an appropriate
definition of defeasible expansion, which will be touched on
in next section. In the meantime, note that Classical Recov-
ery follows from Containment.
Definition 7. − is an admissible defeasible contraction op-
erator if E−α |∼ β 6 α |∼ β and E−α |∼ β = E− γ |∼ δ
if α |∼ β ≡E γ |∼ δ. An admissible contraction opera-
tor − is a basic defeasible contraction operator if it is de-
fined as follows: E − α |∼ β def= E′, where E′ is an epistemic
state such that Uf (E′) = Uf (E) if α |∼ β /∈ B(E), and
Uf (E′) = Uf (E) ∪minEJα ∧ ¬βK otherwise.
Theorem 4. − satisfies (B-1) to (B-8) if and only if it is a
basic defeasible contraction operator.
The Inertia postulate for contraction requires that an epis-
temic state remains unchanged after a contraction by α |∼ β
when α |∼ β is not in the defeasible belief set associated
with the epistemic satate.
If α |∼ β 6∈ B(E), then E− (α |∼ β) = E (Inertia)
Inertia should not hold, in general, for reasons similar to the
case for Inertia for revision. Instead, it is more reasonable
to consider a weaker version of Inertia where the defeasi-
ble belief set associated with an epistemic state remains un-
changed after a contraction by α |∼ β when α |∼ β is not in
the defeasible belief set associated with the epistemic satate.
If α |∼ β /∈ B(E), then
B(E− α |∼ β) = B(E) (Weak Inertia)
Basic defeasible contraction does not satisfy Weak Inertia.
Example 9. For P = {p, q} let E be s.t. E(pq) = E(pq) =
〈f, 0〉 and E(pq) = E(pq) = 〈f, 1〉. Observe that p |∼ q /∈
B(E). Basic defeasible contraction allows for contraction by
p |∼ q to result in E′ where E′(pq) = 〈f, 0〉 and E′(pq) =
E′(pq) = E′(pq) = 〈f, 1〉. Note that q |∼ p ∈ B(E), but
q |∼ p /∈ B(E′).
The postulate below is a semantic version of Weak Inertia.
If α |∼ β /∈ B(E), then Uf (E) = Uf (E− α |∼ β) and
E(u) = (E− α |∼ β)(u)
for all u ∈ Uf (E) (Semantic Weak Inertia)
Proposition 3. A basic defeasible contraction operator −
satisfies Weak Inertia iff it satisfies Semantic Weak Inertia.
The main difference between classsical propositional
logic and the version of defeasibility logic presented in this
paper is the ability to express defeasible implications, with
statements of the the form α |∼ β being viewed as defeasi-
ble (and therefore weaker) versions of classical implications
of the form α → β. Given this context, it makes sense to
consider the following postulate.
If γ → δ ∈ Bc(E) \ Bc(E − α |∼ β), then γ |∼ δ ∈
B(E− α |∼ β). (Defeasibility)
Defeasibility is an expression of minimal change. It states
that when a classical implication does not hold anymore, it
should be weakened to a defeasible implication. This postu-
late can be expressed semantically as follows.
(S-0) If v /∈ Uf (E), then (E−α |∼ β)(u) ≺ (E−α |∼ β)(v)
for all u ∈ Uf (E) (Defeasible Weakening)
Proposition 4. A basic defeasible contraction operator sat-
isfies Defeasibility if and only if it satisfies (S0).
6 Full Defeasible Contraction
In this section we strengthen basic defeasible contraction to
obtain a version of full defeasible contraction that is the con-
traction counterpart of full (coherence) defeasible revision.
The starting point is the specification of five postulates for
iterated contraction.
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(BDP-1) If α  γ, then ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E − α) implies
¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− α ∨ β)) iff ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ − α)
implies ¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ − α ∨ β))
(BDP-2) If γ  α, then ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E − α) implies
¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− α ∨ β)) iff ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ − α)
implies ¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ − α ∨ β))
(BDP-3) If ¬β |∼ γ, then if ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E − γ − α)
implies ¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ − α ∨ β)), then ((¬α |∼ δ ∈
B(E− α) implies ¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− α ∨ β))
(BDP-4) If γ |∼ β, then if ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E−γ−α) implies
¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E−γ−α∨β)), then ((¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E−α)
implies ¬α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− α ∨ β))
(BDP-5) If α  ¬γ, then for all δ, α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− α |∼ β)
iff α |∼ δ ∈ B(E− γ |∼ β − α |∼ β)
The fifth postulate is the contraction analogue of (BDP*5) in
the section on Full Defeasible Revision. The first four pos-
tulates are analogues of the iterated contraction postulates
for classical contraction presented by Koniezny and Pino-
Pérez (). The latter can be viewed as the contraction ana-
logues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for classical revi-
sion. This is perhaps made more clear when considering the
semantic versions of the five postulates above.
(SDP-1) If u, v ∈ Jα ∧ ¬βK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E− α |∼ β) (u)  (E− α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP-2) If u, v ∈ Jα ∧ βK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E− α |∼ β) (u)  (E− α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP-3) If u ∈ Jα∧¬βK and v ∈ Jα∧βK, then E(u) ≺ E(v)
implies (E− α |∼ β) (u) ≺ (E− α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP-4) If u ∈ Jα∧¬βK and v ∈ Jα∧βK, then E(u)  E(v)
implies (E− α |∼ β) (u)  (E− α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP-5) If u, v ∈ J¬αK, then E(u)  E(v) iff
(E− α |∼ β) (u)  (E− α |∼ β) (v)
(SDP-1) states that elements of Jα ∧ ¬βK keep their relative
ordering when contracting by α |∼ β. (SDP-2) states that
elements of Jα ∧ βK keep their relative ordering when con-
tracting by α |∼ β. (SDP-3) and (SDP-4) together state that
when contracting by α |∼ β, elements of Jα ∧ ¬βK can be
slid “down” w.r.t. the elements of Jα∧βK. (SDP-5) does not
have a classical Darwiche-Pearl counterpart but is the con-
traction analogue of (SDP*5). It says that when contracting
by α |∼ β, the elements of J¬αK keep their relative ordering,
but there is no constraint on how the elements of J¬αK move
w.r.t. the elements of JαK.
Lemma 2. Given postulates (B-1)-(B-8), for i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (BDP-i) and (SDP-i) are equivalent.
This allows us to define full defeasible contraction.
Definition 8. A full defeasible contraction operator is de-
fined to be a basic defeasible contraction operator satisfying
(SDP-1)-(SDP-5).
Theorem 5. − satisfies (B-1)-(B-8) and (BDP-1)-(BDP-5)
if and only if it is a full defeasible contraction operator.
We conclude this section with a concrete defeasible con-
traction operator. It is the contraction analogue of Natural
(Coherence) Defeasible Revision. It moves the minimal ele-
ments of Jα ∧ ¬βK down as little as possible to ensure that
α |∼ β does not hold in the contracted epistemic state.
Definition 9. (Natural Defeasible Contraction)
Natural Defeasible Contraction: E− α |∼ β def= E′ where
1. if E 6 α |∼ β or α |∼ β ≡E > |∼ >, then E′ = E; else
2. E′(u) = E(u) for all u ∈ (U∞(E) \minEJα ∧ ¬βK) ∪
{v ∈ Uf (E) | E(v) ≺ rEminJα ∧ βK ∩ Uf (E)}, E′(u) =
E(u) + 1 for all u ∈ {v ∈ Uf (E) | rEminJα ∧ βK  v},
and E′(u) = rEminJα ∧ βK for all u ∈ minEJα ∧ ¬βK.
Natural Defeasible Contraction is a full defeasible con-
traction operator that satisfies Inertia (and therefore Weak
Inertia), as well as Defeasibility.
7 Interdefinability
In this section we investigate the extent to which defea-
sible revision and contraction can be defined in terms of
each other. Our first results show that the Classical Levi and
Harper Identities hold when restricting revision and contrac-
tion to classical statements.
Proposition 5. 1. For every basic (full) defeasible revision
operator ∗ there is a basic (full) defeasible contraction op-
erator − s.t. Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) = Bc(E− α |∼ ⊥) + α.
2. For every basic (full) coherence defeasible revision op-
erator ∗ there is a basic (full) defeasible contraction opera-
tor − s.t. Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) = Bc(E− α |∼ ⊥) + α.
3. For every basic (full) defeasible contraction opera-
tor − there is a basic (full) defeasible revision operator ∗
s.t. Bc(E− α |∼ ⊥ = Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) ∩ Bc(E).
4. For every basic (full) defeasible contraction operator−
there is a basic (full) coherence defeasible revision operator
∗ s.t. Bc(E− α |∼ ⊥ = Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥) ∩ Bc(E).
The next results show that the Levi Identity does not
hold on the level of the belief sets associated with epistemic
states, and that the Harper Identity holds only for coherence
defeasible revision.
Proposition 6. 1. It is not always the case that for every ba-
sic (full) defeasible revision operator ∗ there is a basic (full)
defeasible contraction operator − s.t. Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) =
Bc(E− α |∼ ¬β) + α→ β.
2. It is not always the case that for every basic (full) co-
herence defeasible revision operator ∗ there is a basic (full)
defeasible contraction operator − s.t. Bc(E ∗ α |∼ β) =
Bc(E− α |∼ ¬β) + α→ β.
3. It is not always the case that for every basic (full) de-
feasible revision operator ∗ there is a basic (full) defeasible
contraction operator − s.t. Bc(E− α |∼ β) = Bc(E ∗ α |∼
¬β) ∩ Bc(E).
4. For every basic (full) coherence defeasible revision op-
erator ∗ there is a basic (full) defeasible contraction opera-
tor − s.t. Bc(E− α |∼ β) = Bc(E ∗ α |∼ ¬β) ∩ Bc(E).
In order to investigate interdefinability on the level of de-
feasible belief sets we need appropriate versions of the Levi
and Harper Identities on this level. For a version of the Levi
Identity for defeasible belief sets, we need an appropriate
version of expansion for defeasible belief sets, which means
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that we need an appropriate version of defeasible conse-
quence. But defeasible consequence for a defeasible set D
is not unique: it can be obtained from any epistemic state
whose associated defeasible belief set contains D.
Definition 10. An operator C(·) on the set of defeasible
sets is a defeasible consequence operator if and only if
for every defeasible set D there is an epistemic state E
s.t. D ⊆ C(D) = B(E). + is a defeasible expansion opera-
tor if and only if there is a defeasible consequence operator
C(·) s.t. B + α |∼ β = C(B ∪ {α |∼ β}).
While there is a case to be made for restricting this broad
definition of defeasible consequence, such an investigation
is beyond the scope of this paper.
The next results show that, on the level of defeasible belief
sets associated with epistemic states, the Levi Identity does
not hold for basic (full) defeasible revision, but it holds for
basic (full) coherence revision.
Proposition 7. 1. It is not the case that for every basic (full)
defeasible revision operator ∗ there is a basic (full) defea-
sible contraction operator − and an expansion operator +
s.t. B(E ∗ α |∼ β) = B(E− α |∼ ¬β) + α |∼ β.
2. For every basic (full) coherence defeasible revision op-
erator ∗ there is a basic (full) defeasible contraction opera-
tor − and a defeasible expansion operator + s.t. B(E ∗α |∼
β) = B(E− α |∼ ¬β) + α |∼ β.
This places us in a position to introduce a version of the
Recovery postulate for defeasible belief sets.
If α |∼ β ∈ B(E) and α |∼ ⊥ /∈ B(E) then
B(E − α |∼ β + α |∼ β) = B(E) (Recovery)
Proposition 8. For every basic defeasible contraction oper-
ator there is a defeasible expansion operator s.t. Recovery
holds.
We conclude this section with an investigation into a ver-
sion of the Harper Identity for defeasible belief sets.
B(E− α |∼ β) =
B(E ∗ α |∼ ¬β) ∩ B(E) (Harper Identity)
Our next results show that it does not hold for basic (full)
defeasible revision or for basic (full) coherence revision. Not
even if Inertia holds.
Proposition 9. 1. It is not the case that for every basic (full)
defeasible contraction operator satisfying Inertia there is a
basic (full) defeasible revision operator s.t. the Harper Iden-
tity holds.
2. It is not the case that for every basic (full) defeasible
contraction operator satisfying Inertia there is a basic (full)
coherence defeasible revision operator s.t. the Harper Iden-
tity holds.
8 Related Work and Conclusion
In this paper we characterised belief change (revision and
contraction) for defeasible reasoning in terms of postulates
and semantic constructions, with a focus on the defeasible
belief sets associated with epistemic states.
The transformation of material implications (α→ β) into
defeasible implications (α |∼ β), as set out in Example 1,
was originally proposed by Falappa et al (2002; 2013).
The connection between belief change and non-
monotonic reasoning is well-known (Gärdenfors and
Makinson 1994). Initial attempts to combine these two ar-
eas resulted in the Gardënfors’ paradox (Gärdenfors 1988;
Rott 1989) which deals with the revision of subjunctive con-
ditionals representing the revision policies themselves. Most
of the work dealing with the revision of conditionals, such
as those by Kern-Isberner (1999; 2018) and Wobcke (1995),
assume such a perspective. They model the revision of sub-
junctive conditionals representing the revision operator in
the object language. In contrast, our versions of conditionals
(defeasible statements) do not encode the revision policies,
but rather follow from such policies which are encoded in
the epistemic states. In our case there is a clear separation
between object level and meta level. Note that only one di-
rection of the Ramsey Test (Gärdenfors 1988) holds for our
proposal. While it is the case that β ∈ Bc(E ∗ ¬α |∼ ⊥)
implies α |∼ β ∈ B(E), the converse does not hold (recall
that α can be represented as ¬α |∼ ⊥).
In the original work of Kern-Isberner (1999) her epistemic
states have less structure than ours. The two approaches are
compatible, but not equivalent. E.g., our approach doesn’t
satisfy her CR2 postulate. Our motivation for CR2 not hold-
ing is related to the additional structure of our epistemic
states. Also, while her CR3 postulate can be made to hold
in our framework, it carries with it an assumption that is at
odds with our proposal: that > |∼ α is an appropriate repre-
sentation of the propositional statement α. In our approach
such an α is expressible as ¬α |∼ ⊥.
Strongly connected to the present paper is previous work
by Casini et al. (2016; 2017; 2018), formulating a gen-
eral AGM-like approach for defeasible reasoning. While the
main overall focus is the same, there are important differ-
ences. (i) We focus on defeasible belief sets that are rational
(Lehmann and Magidor 1992), which allows for a simpler
semantic representation. (ii) The simpler semantic represen-
tation used here has some other advantages, such as the abil-
ity to perform iterated change. (iii) The previous framework
is premised on the ability to distinguish, within a defeasi-
ble belief set, between those that are truly defeasible, and
those that are not, the latter forming the monotonic core of
the defeasible belief set (Casini and Meyer 2017). Ware un-
able to draw such a distinction. Or rather, our assumption is
the boundary case where the monotonic core of a defeasible
belief set associated with an epistemic state E coincides with
the classical belief set associated with E. Other recent con-
tributions to revision in a non-monotonic framework include
work from Hunter (2016), dealing with highly implausible
conditionals, and Delgrande et al. (2013), analysing belief
change in an ASP framework.
The next step is to enrich the representation of epistemic
states by including the notion of the monotonic core (Casini
and Meyer 2017) of a defeasible belief set. Beyond general-
ising the present proposal, this will allow us to link the cur-
rent paper more directly to our previous work. Other future
work includes an extension to other well-known forms of it-
erated change, such as lexicographic revision (Nayak 1994),
as well as restrained revision and the more general class of
admissible revision operators (Booth and Meyer 2006).
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